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Reformist Multipolarity and Global Trade Governance in an 
Era of Systemic Power Redistribution 
Abstract 
This article assesses the role of emerging powers in the liberal order by examining 
the diplomacy of these states in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation. 
The article discusses the changing shape of global trade governance through the 
insights provided by multipolarity, unipolarity and critical perspectives on emerging 
states. Based on the insights provided by these approaches, the paper provides an 
analytical account of WTO negotiations to argue that the changing position of 
emerging powers in global trade governance is indicative of a system of reformist 
multipolarity. This system entails three major characteristics. First, it is based on a 
multipolar decision-making process where established and emerging powers hold 
veto power over the negotiating process but commit to the stable management of 
the global economy. Second, it comprises a nascent great power concert where 
established and emerging powers share a common world-view on the centrality of 
the WTO to operate as the overarching authority for regulating and managing global 
trade. Third, emerging states maintain a reformist approach in this multipolar 
system seeking to re-negotiate the rights and responsibilities to be undertaken by 
each major stakeholder. 
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1. Introduction 
Theoretical approaches to emerging powers attempt to investigate whether the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) act as revisionist or cooperative 
states in the liberal order. Multipolarity perspectives expect the rise of the BRICS to 
lead to a system of great power conflict that destabilises the existing liberal order. 
Unipolarity perspectives expect a system of great power concert to take form as 
emerging powers peacefully integrate to the liberal order. Critical approaches expect 
emerging powers to maintain a reformist stance as they experience the pressures 
exercised by structures of the global economy. While these theoretical approaches 
present a broader picture of systemic power redistribution, more empirically-
focused studies on emerging powers do not examine in detail how power is re-
allocated across different major regimes of global governance. Many accounts rely 
upon a “few stylised facts” to indicate general trends in global governance without 
engaging in sufficient empirical analysis to substantiate their broader theoretical 
claims (Drezner, 2014, p. 129). Major questions therefore remain with regards to the 
role of the BRICS in major regimes such as trade, finance, climate change and non-
proliferation. To what extent have we witnessed the emergence of multipolarity in 
these regimes? Is the shape of multipolarity in these regimes a form of great power 
conflict or great power concert? Is the integration of emerging powers in these 
regimes supporting global governance or is it causing friction and systemic crisis? 
This paper attempts to address such questions to offer a more concise analysis of 
the role of emerging powers in global trade governance. The paper examines the 
power transition that has unfolded during the on-going Doha Round the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and analyses this transition process through the insights 
provided by multipolarity, unipolarity and critical approaches. The WTO is a 
promising case study for extracting valuable empirical evidence for understanding 
the relevance of major theoretical approaches to emerging states. This is because 
the WTO has comprised the first institution to have witnessed the redistribution of 
decision-making power among established and emerging powers. In contrast to the 
inflexible structures of other institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, 
the WTO has a flexible and informal structure that rapidly responds to changes in the 
global balance of power. It is therefore an ideal environment for understanding the 
changing role of emerging powers in the liberal order. As the Brazilian diplomat and 
Doha Round negotiator Braz Baracuhy has noted: “the Doha Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations constitutes a microcosm of the rising tensions between old and 
new powers and the challenges of continuity and change in the international order” 
(Baracuhy, 2012a, p. 108). 
To understand the role of the BRICS in the WTO, this article proceeds as follows. 
First, major approaches to emerging powers are presented, identifying the insights 
put forward by each approach with regards to the shifting role of emerging powers 
in the liberal order. Based on these approaches, the paper then present an analytical 
approach and identifies a system of reformist multipolarity in the conduct of the 
global trading system. This system entails three major dimensions that are examined 
in three different sub-sections. First, it is based on a multipolar decision-making 
process where established and emerging powers hold veto power over the 
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negotiating process but commit to the stable management of the system. Second, it 
is indicative of a nascent great power concert where established and emerging 
powers share a common world-view on the centrality of the WTO to operate as the 
overarching authority for regulating and managing global trade. Third, emerging 
states maintain a reformist approach in the concert since the rights and 
responsibilities to be undertaken by each major power are still negotiated. 
 
2. Approaches to emerging powers 
Theoretical approaches to emerging powers attempt to understand the role of these 
states in a global process of systemic power redistribution. Three major approaches 
can be identified: (i) multipolarity perspectives that identify a system of great power 
conflict; (ii) unipolarity perspectives that identify of great power concert; and (iii) 
critical approaches that expect emerging powers to maintain a reformist stance as 
they integrate to the neoliberal order. While there are variations within these 
approaches, these three perspectives broadly define the possible paths of the BRICS 
to the liberal order (Schweller, 2011). 
 
Multipolarity and great power conflict 
Multipolarity approaches traditionally view emerging states as revisionist powers 
that are increasingly dissatisfied with the existing system and upset the global 
balance of power through confrontation. This is not only because of the aspirations 
of emerging states to achieve greater status, but also because of systemic changes 
that are triggered by their own rise and set them in a conflicting course against 
established powers, ultimately leading to instability and great power conflict 
(Mearscheimer, 2002). This line of thinking has been shaped by major thinkers of 
neo-realism. Waltz notes that if one power prevails in a bipolar system (as the US did 
in the Cold War), then such a process would rapidly lead to counter-balancing by 
other major powers that fear the overt concentration of power by the hegemon 
(Waltz, 1979). Giplin also examines how emerging powers increasingly challenge the 
legitimacy of a system that does not recognise their new-found status. The 
increasing disjuncture between the actual distribution of power and the distribution 
of prestige can only be resolved through conflict (Gilpin, 1981). The classic example 
is 19th century imperial Germany and the manner in which its rise led to upsetting 
the balance of power and triggering the First World War. 
The end of the Cold War is often viewed on these terms. The transition from 
bipolarity to multipolarity increases the possibilities for conflict as the balance of 
power becomes more difficult to manage amongst established and emerging powers 
(Mearscheimer, 1990). The post-Cold War system entails changes in the distribution 
of power (and especially growth rates) but maintains the same anarchical nature 
that drives new powers to increasingly face the necessity of counter-balancing the 
hegemon (Layne, 1993). The difference with earlier versions of multipolarity is that 
changes in the distribution of power are now measured in economic and not military 
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terms. Nevertheless, economic multipolarity operates in a similar way and increases 
rivalry between major powers. Economic and military rivalry can be connected and 
be mutually reinforcing (Kennedy, 1989). During the early 1990s, Japan and Germany 
(second and third largest economies respectively at that point) were often viewed as 
states that would ultimately have to counter-balance US hegemony (Waltz, 1993). 
Other multipolarity perspectives are further questioning these assumptions. They 
argue that conflict is not inevitable under multipolarity since there are different 
options available to the great powers (such as unilateralism, special bilateral 
relationships and collective security arrangements) that allow them to maintain 
peace (Kegley and Raymond, 1994). The post-Cold War system can be understood as 
“benign multipolarity” where the hegemon and established powers can engage with 
each other on a non-confrontational basis and collaborate to maintain stability 
within their respective regions (Kupchan, 1998). Benign multipolarity can be socially 
constructed since the behaviour of the major powers can shape the form of 
multipolarity and diffuse any tensions that emerge from systemic changes (ibid). In 
this respect, the relationship between the hegemon and emerging powers is defined 
by how they interpret each other’s’ behaviour and is not structurally imposed by the 
distribution of relative capabilities (Mastanduno, 1997). Throughout the 1990s, the 
US accommodated status-quo powers such as Germany and Japan and engaged 
transition states such as Russia and China. The US would only confront revisionist 
states but none of the emerging powers seemed to pose as such (ibid, p. 63).  
Multipolarity therefore remains an inherently conflictual system but can 
nevertheless be managed with greater stability if major powers commit to a process 
of diffusing tensions and minimising great power rivalry. Nevertheless, some 
perspectives stress that there is a limit to which multipolarity can be managed since 
global anarchy and the changing distribution of capabilities (such as uneven growth) 
encourage major powers to search and take advantage of opportunities to expand 
their power at the expense of other powers (Posen, 2009). Today, the military 
“imperial overstretch” of the US and the relative decline of the US economy against 
the BRICS are systemic trends that keep pushing established and emerging powers to 
participate in a competitive multipolar setting (Layne, 2011; 2012). 
 
Unipolarity and great power concert 
Unipolarity approaches view emerging powers as supporters of the current order 
that aim to peacefully ascend within the hierarchy of states and participate in the 
management of the existing order. Rather than being driven into great power 
conflict, major powers join the hegemon in collective or concert-based 
arrangements that help realise common benefits and manage systemic crises 
(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991). Such arrangements allow major powers to engage in 
competition and disagreement without undermining the stability of the existing 
order (ibid). Emerging powers may indirectly challenge certain policies of the 
hegemon but do not seek to challenge the legitimacy of the order itself. In contrast 
to the hard-counter balancing evident in multipolarity perspectives, unipolarity 
perspectives only expect indirect balancing to take place (Lieber and Alexander, 
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2005, pp. 114-115). This is because emerging powers perceive hard counter-
balancing as a costly option and are not willing to take an assertive stance, at least 
before they are confident they have further developed their material capabilities 
(Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008). In this respect, the more stratified the distribution of 
capabilities is, the less likely are emerging powers willing to engage in competition. 
In a unipolar stratification, emerging powers are less likely to pursue revisionist 
policies and challenge the status quo, and such reluctance reduces the possibilities 
for great power conflict (Wohlforth, 2009). This line of thinking reflects the 
conditions of the 00s. Multipolarity was not as imminent as initially predicted and US 
unipolarity persisted and re-emerged after 9/11. At the same time, the lack of 
evidence of any counter-balancing by the BRICS reflected the absence of great 
power conflict (Ikenberry et al, 2009). 
Under unipolarity, emerging powers prefer to engage in great power politics through 
other strategies such as band-wagoning, neutrality, and soft-balancing (Pape, 2005; 
Walt, 2009). Soft-balancing represents a measured risk emerging powers are willing 
to take to challenge certain aspects of the existing hegemony. Even such limited 
balancing, however, does not always drive emerging power behaviour which may 
simply be focused on pursuing self-interests and may engage in normal policy 
disputes with the hegemon (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005). Soft balancing therefore 
may not amount to anything more than “routine diplomatic friction” (Lieber and 
Alexander, 2005). Global governance in the 00s was often characterised by such 
every-day diplomatic friction between the US and the BRICS. Under unipolarity, the 
behaviour of the major powers remains important as they can determine the level of 
competition, albeit in indirect form, in the global system (Kupchan, 2011; Monteiro, 
2011). This is especially because emerging powers such as China have not yet 
formulated a grand strategy of promoting multipolarity and remain ambivalent in 
their engagement with the US (Schweller and Pu, 2011). 
Unipolarity perspectives overall expect minimal conflict and rivalry. They stress that 
emerging powers do not seek the dissolution of the liberal international order and 
the creation of a new one. Instead, the realisation of their power ambitions 
necessitates integration with existing institutions (Ikenberry, 2010). The prospects 
for cooperation are increased by the qualities of the liberal international order that 
distinguish it from previous orders (Ikenberry and Wright, 2008). The liberal order is 
not susceptible to transformation through warfare but is rather built upon rules-
based multilateral institutions that regulate state behaviour and restrain revisionist 
tendencies. Established and emerging powers participate in an array of cooperative 
relationships that allow the latter to be recognised rather than relegated downwards 
in the hierarchy of nations. The order is therefore open to emerging states by 
providing “access points and opportunities for political communication and 
reciprocal influence” (ibid, p. 10). For the BRICS, the current order is “harder to 
overturn and easier to join” and they are more likely to follow a policy of integration 
and accommodation rather than revisionism (ibid). 
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Critical approaches and reformism 
Critical perspectives argue that emerging powers have a limited potential to 
transform the liberal order because of their structural position in the global 
economy. They stress how the integration of emerging powers into the global 
economy allows them to become economically competitive but prohibits them from 
pursuing revisionist politics and promoting an alternative order (Vanaik, 2013). 
Emerging powers can exercise greater influence in global governance due to their 
high rates of growth but are simultaneously forced to follow the rules of the global 
production, trade and investment regimes (Palat, 2008, p. 722-724). This process of 
integration can be traced back to the ideological triumph of neoliberalism in the 
Third World during the 1980s and 90s (Augelli and Murphy, 1988; Biersteker, 1992). 
Prior to implementing neoliberal reforms, states such as China and India projected a 
world-view of Third Worldism and non-alignment that antagonised the liberal order. 
The process of state restructuring, however, led to the decline of such counter-
hegemony since “the vision of constructing an alternative way of ordering 
international economic relations had dissipated” (McDowell, 1994, p. 502).    
Critical perspectives highlight the role of multilateralism in disciplining emerging 
powers. Multilateral institutions are governed by the G-7 states and allow for 
diffusing any tensions between them and securing the smooth operation of the 
existing order (Gill, 1997, p. 8-9). Such institutions limit the possibilities for 
institutional innovation, marginalise alternative visions of world order and discipline 
emerging states that challenge the status quo and promote radical demands 
(Schechter, 1999). Multilateralism gradually expands through new types of 
institutions that promote state restructuring in the global South. Developing 
countries that previously followed inward looking, mercantilist and self-sufficient 
economic models are forced to integrate with global capitalism (Gill, 1997, pp. 11-
12). These conditions were evident in the 1990s through the emergence of what 
critical perspectives describe as the “new constitutionalism” (Schechter, 1999). 
Institutions such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank supervised economic 
policies in a number of developing countries through new forms of regulations and 
structural adjustment. In the 00s, “new constitutionalism” further expanded to force 
the BRICS to accept the Washington Consensus. The G-7 “group hegemony” granted 
certain benefits to the BRICS to achieve their integration in the liberal order but 
simultaneously blocked any attempts by these states to promote redistribution of 
global wealth and undermine the rules and norms of the liberal order (Bailin, 2005). 
New bodies such as the G-20 (Finance) were designed by the G-7 with the aim of 
binding emerging powers to the surveillance mechanisms of the IMF and the World 
Bank, and reinforce the ideological orthodoxy of free capital mobility in these states 
(Soederberg, 2002). 
Critical perspectives examine how the integration of emerging powers to the liberal 
order and its multilateral institutions shapes the world-views of these states. 
Emerging powers are dependent upon the liberal order for maintaining their growth 
while simultaneously experiencing the social tensions produced by such integration. 
Major shifts in the global economy (such the emergence of East-Asian 
regionalisation) unfold within the American Empire and do not cause the formation 
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of ideological alternatives (Parisot, 2013). The rise of the BRICS is a product of 
uneven development and accumulation in the global economy. Their economic 
success is integral to the neoliberal system and causes its re-production rather than 
decline (Saull, 2012). The BRICS have realised the long-due demands of the South for 
greater participation in global governance, but they have simultaneously eroded 
“the broader emancipatory and universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for 
independence, equality and justice” originally envisioned by the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and the G-77 (Golub, 2013, p. 1013). Emerging powers have 
enhanced their voice in global governance but cannot use such leverage to challenge 
the US-centric liberal order and promote greater democracy, equality and social 
justice (Gray and Murphy, 2013). As a result of these processes, emerging powers 
settle for a reformist approach that aims to take advantage of the opportunities 
granted by neo-liberalism while renegotiating the most negative effects of 
globalisation (Jordaan, 2003; Nel, 2010). Reformism reflects overall the limits of the 
BRICS in promoting major transformation and reveals their tendency to seek change 
from within and not outside the liberal order. 
 
An analytical framework 
Multipolarity perspectives expect the rise of the BRICS to increase the possibilities 
for great power conflict but allow for a degree of stability if established and 
emerging powers commit to the management of global governance. Unipolarity 
perspectives expect limited conflict and a greater willingness of all powers to 
participate in a great power concert since all parties gain from participating in the 
liberal order. Critical perspectives argue that the integration of the BRICS to the 
liberal order and its multilateral institutions leads to adopting a reformist stance that 
inhibits pursuing revisionist politics. 
Based on these insights, the article derives an analytical framework of emerging 
power behaviour in global trade governance to argue that the rise of the BRICS in the 
WTO has led to the formation of a system of reformist multipolarity. Such a system 
involves three dimensions: (i) it entails a multipolar distribution of power in its 
decision-making structure where established and emerging powers hold veto power 
over the negotiating process but commit to the stable management of the system; 
(ii) both established and emerging powers share a common world-view on the 
centrality of the WTO to operate as the overarching authority for regulating and 
managing global trade; and (iii) emerging states maintain a reformist approach in the 
concert where the rights and responsibilities to be undertaken by each major 
stakeholder are still negotiated. 
 
3. Reformist multipolarity in global trade governance 
Multipolarity in the WTO 
Multipolarity in global trade can primarily be identified in the exercise of influence in 
the decision-making process of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO is the 
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prime organisation for governing global trade given its extensive legal jurisdiction, its 
enforcement mechanisms and its almost universal membership. The role of major 
powers in the WTO is determined not only by their material capabilities (share of 
world trade), but also their bargaining skills and expertise, and their legitimacy in 
representing broader segments of the organisation’s membership. Since its 
formation in 1995, the WTO has experienced a significant power transition where 
leading developing countries have emerged as key players in the decision-making 
process. Despite prolonged tensions, the WTO has not witness the emergence of 
great power conflict but rather a transition to stable multipolarity. Such stability 
derived from two conditions. First, established and emerging powers have shown 
the willingness to sit at the negotiating table and search for consensus despite their 
different views on the role of the WTO. Second, emerging powers have strived to 
control their alliances with other developing countries and diffuse any tensions that 
would lead to institutional crisis and breakdown.  
Multipolarity in global trade effectively existed since the 1970s and 80s. The US and 
the EU dominated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with other 
developed countries playing a key role in the negotiations. The eight and last round 
of the GATT (the Uruguay Round, 1986-94) was concluded after agreement was 
reached among the Quad (US, EU, Japan, Canada) with the consent of other 
influential developed countries such as Australia (leader of the Cairns Group of 
agricultural exporters). The Uruguay Round led to the formation of the WTO in 1995, 
an institution that was effectively built upon Western interests and preferences. The 
WTO allowed for a process of asymmetrical bargaining though which developing 
countries were always given the promise of more opportunities but real market 
access was mostly provided to developed countries (Wilkinson, 2011). Nevertheless, 
the WTO granted a “deliberative potential” to all members and therefore provided 
the incentives to developing countries to strive and proactively shape negotiations 
(Higgott and Erman, 2010, pp. 466-69). These conditions meant that WTO 
negotiations were marked by tensions but also that the organisation provided access 
to emerging economies. This became clear with the collapse of the 1999 Seattle 
ministerial that demonstrated that the global South could exercise veto power in the 
negotiations.  
To maintain the legitimacy of the WTO, the US, the EU and other developed 
countries agreed to a launch a new platform of negotiations: the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA, or Doha Round). The DDA was proposed by the US and the EU as an 
agreement placing development at the centre of global trade and demonstrated 
their willingness to accommodate the interests of emerging economies. Certain 
emerging powers such as South Africa joined the US and the EU in supporting the 
DDA but others (notably India) resisted the launch of the DDA and remained 
outsiders. The DDA was finally launched in 2001 and ratified the accession of China 
in the WTO, showing how the US and the EU recognised that global trade could 
effectively be governed only if all emerging economies participated in the DDA. They 
also appeared, however, to assume that they could still determine on their own the 
direction of negotiations. The US and EU attempts at promoting new issues and 
neglecting agriculture, a pivotal issue for emerging economies, caused the 
frustration of the latter. Such frustration ultimately led to the collapse of WTO 
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negotiations in Cancun in 2003, an event that can be seen to first demonstrate the 
emergence of multipolarity in the WTO. Leading developing countries such as Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa formed the G-20 (Trade) coalition, which successfully 
blocked US and EU initiatives and proposed an alternative agenda seeking ambitious 
agricultural liberalisation and developmental provisions (Narlikar and Tussie, 2004). 
The Cancun collapse amply demonstrated the re-balancing of influence between 
North and South and demonstrated that emerging powers effectively held veto 
power over the negotiations (Taylor, 2007). Within a few months the US and the EU 
recognised Brazil and India (leaders of the G-20) as key actors for achieving progress 
and invited them to provide leadership in resuming negotiations. The US and the EU 
understood that the WTO would only retain its legitimacy if leading developing 
countries were recognised as major players and participated in managing the 
multipolar distribution of trade power (Deese, 2008). The 2005 Hong Kong 
ministerial witnessed the emergence of the G-4 (US, EU, Brazil, India), a new group 
encompassing both established and emerging powers that was more effective and 
legitimate in driving the negotiating process (Wilkinson, 2006). Also described as the 
‘New Quad’, the G-4 replaced the traditional Quad (US, EU, Japan, Canada) that had 
successfully provided leadership in the GATT and depicted the emergence of a 
North-South multipolar system of governance in the WTO (Efstathopoulos, 2012). 
The G-4 states were not bound by the collective understandings that had 
underpinned the Western-centric Quad, but nevertheless shared a common interest 
in achieving progress in the DDA. 
The redistribution of power in the WTO reflected broader changes in the balance of 
power at the global level. The BRICs acronym was first announced in 2003 and 
predicted that emerging economies would overcome the G-7 industrialised nations 
in a few decades (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003). During this period, various 
multilateral fora recognised the rise of the BRICS. The G-8 invited the Outreach-5 
states (Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Mexico) to join their summits, reflecting 
the understanding of Western leaders that the global economy could not realistically 
be managed in the absence of emerging economies. The G-20 Finance group also 
invited the leaders of emerging economies to the same effect, while the IMF and the 
World Bank began a process of re-allocating voting quotas to emerging economies in 
order to reflect the changing realities of the global economy (Wade, 2011). 
Multipolarity in the WTO therefore reflected the advent of multipolarity in other 
areas of global governance. In contrast to multipolarity perspectives that expected 
the re-distribution of economic capabilities to increase tensions and rivalry, 
multipolarity in global economic governance satisfied the core interests of emerging 
powers. The WTO in particular could rapidly accommodate the rise of the BRICS 
because of its flexible and informal decision-making process (Steinberg, 2002). The 
process lacks clear rules and guidelines and benefits the major economies with the 
greatest bargaining capacity exactly because the lack of formalised structures does 
not involve the burden of institutional reform (as in the case of the UN Security 
Council).  
The formation of the G-4 allowed established and emerging powers to manage 
multipolarity in global trade rather than being driven into competition by systemic 
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factors. These states strived to agree on the balance of commitments over critical 
areas such as agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Special and 
Differential Treatment (Efstathopoulos, 2012). The ministerial meeting that took 
place in Geneva in July 2008 was a particularly critical moment as all major players 
were close to reaching agreement but the meeting collapsed due to disagreement 
over flexibilities on food security (Wolfe, 2010). For sceptics, the G-4 represented an 
unstable version of multipolarity that could easily erupt into great power conflict. 
That would normally take shape through lack of dialogue, trade wars, the erosion of 
monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms, and the retreat of major economies to 
regional trade blocs. In certain instances, relations between the US, the EU, Brazil 
and India were often marked by tensions and a ‘blame game’ over who is 
responsible for the deadlock. Despite the lack of agreement, however, the WTO did 
not experience a process of great power conflict and stability was maintained since 
all parties kept returning to the negotiating table and remained committed to the 
DDA. 
The second condition that ensured the formation of stable multipolarity in the WTO 
was the ability of emerging powers to control their South-South alliances. As noted 
by certain multipolarity perspectives, the condition of stable multipolarity requires 
not only communication between major powers but also their willingness to manage 
broader systemic changes. Emerging powers must not only show restraint but also 
refrain from using their alliances to challenge the hegemon. It could be argued that 
the ability of emerging powers to discipline the global South was actually expected 
and encouraged by the US and the EU. By recognising Brazil and India as major 
stakeholders, the US and the EU broadened the “enacting coalition” of the global 
trading system by allowing Southern powers to participate in the process of 
institutional design (in this case the DDA) (Gruber, 2000, pp. 81-86). The result was 
that “the emergence of these new stakeholders could cause even the most stalwart 
opponents of the enacting coalition’s cooperative initiative to think twice about 
tampering with it if and when they were to someday take power themselves” (ibid, 
p. 86). 
Emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa played a critical role in 
alleviating the frustration and more radical demands of the developing world. This 
was a significant process because certain developing countries remained resistant to 
progress in the DDA and became more active in criticising the North for their unfair 
practices (Gallagher, 2007; Lee, 2012). Such frustration was a result of the broader 
diffusion of power in the WTO and could lead to systemic crisis causing the collapse 
of negotiations. Emerging powers retained the promise of development for the 
global South and committed to defending its core demands within the G-4. Even 
though the WTO retained a hierarchical structure, emerging powers improved the 
prospects of developing countries’ participation in the WTO by representing 
different groups and coalitions in the G-4 (Narlikar, 2010). In many cases, emerging 
powers defended interests that were not their own but were vital for other 
developing countries. Because of the need to control their alliances, Brazil and India 
could not provide many concessions in the G-4 (Efstathopoulos, 2012). Disagreement 
therefore within the G-4 did not signify a lack of commitment over the WTO’s 
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stability but rather reflected the belief of emerging powers that achieving such 
stability required alleviating the frustration of weaker members.  
The WTO therefore appeared to fit the notion of stable multipolarity because of two 
conditions. First, the scenario of great power conflict was alleviated because of the 
willingness of established and emerging powers to sit at the negotiating table and 
search for consensus despite their different views on the DDA. Second, a broader 
crisis was avoided because of the willingness of emerging powers to control their 
alliances of developing countries and diffuse any tensions that would lead to crisis 
and breakdown. The role of emerging powers in managing their Southern coalitions 
demonstrates the significance of exploring not only the relations between the major 
poles of the global economy, but also the relations of these poles with smaller 
states. Emerging powers acted as catalysts in overcoming the collective resistance of 
developing countries and persuading these states to participate in the WTO, 
generating powerful incentives for both major and smaller developing countries to 
participate in negotiations that can lead to collective goods (Miller, 1994). Such 
conditions not only allowed for stable multipolarity to emerge, but also facilitated 
the formation of a great power concert (ibid). As shown below, the conditions for 
the formation of such a concert became evident with the onset of the 2008 global 
economic crisis. 
 
A nascent great power concert 
The formation of stable multipolarity in the WTO during 2001-8 demonstrated the 
willingness of major powers to refrain from engaging in trade wars and commit to 
multilateral negotiations as the primary avenue for managing global trade. The 
outbreak, however, of the global economic crisis at the end of 2008 provided the 
critical test for the stability of the WTO. The crisis has often been seen to create the 
conditions for great power conflict, realising the scenario of the 1930s when the 
global economy had fragmented into rival regional blocs that engaged in trade wards 
and played a role in further escalating the crisis that led to warfare. Against such 
pessimistic expectations, the WTO has withstood the prospect of institutional 
breakdown and has allowed for the formation of a nascent great power concert. 
Such a concert has maintained the condition of stable multipolarity while further 
consolidating the process of great power cooperation. The foundations of the 
concert can be found in two conditions that existed under the previous years of 
stable multipolarity but were further consolidated after the crisis. The conditions 
were: (i) the willingness of established and emerging powers to share leadership to 
retain the primacy of the WTO; and (ii) their commitment to maintaining a liberal 
trading system that maintain open markets and discourages the use of 
protectionism. 
While unipolarity perspectives would arguably have to recognise the rapid 
emergence of multipolarity in the global economy, they could still demonstrate how 
their expectations for a great power concert have remained very relevant after 2008. 
The global crisis has had a major impact upon global economic governance and has 
further re-defined diplomatic relations between established and emerging 
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economies at the international level. This became evident with the formation of the 
G-20 Leaders Forum in 2008. The willingness of the US to invite the creation of this 
forum verifies those unipolarity perspectives that expect the hegemon and emerging 
powers to participate in cooperative rather than antagonistic relations. The G-20 
leaders initially committed to a so-called ‘standstill provision’ provision, a common 
pledge of the G-20 countries to refrain from introducing protectionist measures 
(Schott, 2010). In all meetings since 2008, the G-20 have also repeatedly referred to 
the conclusion of the Doha Round as a vital part of the collective effort of the G-20 
states for a more assertive management of the post-crisis global economy. The G-20 
calls for revitalising the DDA have often been discredited as rhetoric, but are 
nevertheless indicative of a nascent discourse in global governance that necessitates 
the cooperation of established and emerging powers in order to manage the post-
crisis global economy (Cooper, 2010; Luckhurst, 2012). In this respect, the G-20 also 
demonstrates the relevance of unipolarity perspectives that expect the adaptability 
of the liberal to provide emerging powers with the opportunity to express their voice 
in multilateral fora. 
The relevance of these perspectives has also become evident in global trade. During 
the crisis, the US and the EU have invited emerging powers to assume greater 
responsibilities and leadership in the WTO. US officials have argued that progress in 
negotiations requires emerging economies to commit to higher levels of 
liberalisation. For example, Susan Schwab (United States Trade Representative from 
2006 to 2009) has noted that a sufficient momentum for concluding the Doha Round 
can only be generated when the BRICS assume the responsibilities commensurate to 
their economic weight (Schwab, 2011). The US and the EU have also used plurilateral 
agreements to exercise pressure upon emerging powers, including the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
These initiatives do not indicate the conduct of trade wars but rather the attempt of 
the Obama administration to influence the BRICS to join schemes of trade 
governance built upon US rules (Schott, 2011). The EU has followed the same 
approach and has been confined to ambivalent leadership, also as a result of its 
members’ preoccupation with the Euro-zone crisis. The EU capacity to shape 
negotiations has been declining in the Doha Round but its ability to resist and block 
the agendas of other members remains intact (Young, 2011, p. 727). 
In response to the US and the EU, emerging powers have not engaged in counter-
balancing but have rather reaffirmed their commitment to the WTO. Their tough 
negotiating stance has often led analysts to see them as veto players that fail to be 
proactive and set the negotiating agenda of the WTO (Narlikar, 2013, pp. 561-562). A 
careful reading, however, of the BRICS positions would reveal that the polemic 
language would only qualify as soft-balancing, although some unipolarity 
perspectives would not identify any degree of balancing in their trade diplomacy. 
This is because the BRICS have gradually taken a more positive, albeit cautious, 
approach that aspires to revitalise the importance of state-led development but 
accepts the role of trade liberalisation as an engine of growth (Ismail, 2012; 
Baracuhy, 2012b). The participation of the BRICS in the G-20 Leaders Summit has 
further propelled these states to pursue crisis-management diplomacy and use their 
status as leaders of the global South to re-energise WTO negotiations. After Russia’s 
13 
 
accession to the WTO in 2011, the BRICS have not coordinated their positions 
towards counter-balancing but have only been limited to pronouncing that the 
delicate balance of trade-offs arduously negotiated in the DDA should be further 
sustained and not be undermined by other trade deals (WTO, 2011c, p. 2). The BRICS 
trade ministers have also urged other G-20 members to commit to concluding the 
DDA since this would be the prime way of revitalising the multilateral trading system 
at a time of crisis (BRICS, 2012). Similar initiatives have been undertaken individually 
by emerging powers demonstrating that the BRICS do not seek to directly challenge 
the positions of the US and the EU but rather to ensure that they contribute their 
share in advancing the DDA. 
The commitment of both established and emerging powers to the WTO is not only 
reflected in their willingness to share leadership but also the restraint these powers 
have shown in their domestic policies. In their initial declarations after 2008, the G-
20 leaders urged WTO members to resist initiating protectionist measures. Despite 
initial predictions on the rise of protectionism (Tussie, 2010), it now appears that all 
major traders have retained their commitment to open trade. Protectionism has 
featured prominently after 2008 as a possible tool for mitigating the negative effects 
of the crisis and reducing trade imbalances. Nevertheless, the actual economic 
impact of the protectionist measures introduced post-2008 has been moderate and 
has not caused a return to a 1930s scenario of trade wars as some multipolarity 
perspectives would expect (Bussiere et al, 2011). Major traders have retained their 
commitment to free trade, and especially the emerging economies that have 
benefited from trade liberalisation and have committed to a series of international 
trade agreements (ibid). The distribution of power amongst major traders has not 
led to the collapse but rather the strengthening of global economic governance 
mainly because of the commitment of major economies to the core economic ideas 
of openness and liberalisation (Drezner, 2014, pp. 152-156). 
The role of the WTO itself has been critical in providing incentives, as unipolarity 
perspectives would suggest, that ensure that emerging powers will not act to 
undermine the system. Recent data shows that the crisis has caused an increase in 
various trade restrictions, but these measures have been consistent with WTO rules, 
indicating the capacity of the WTO to diffuse the protectionist surge in major 
economies (Ruddy, 2014). Such success has derived from the organisation’s capacity 
in promoting economic efficiency and accountability in trade transactions, and 
driving negotiations towards the removal of distorting practices. The WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism has also guaranteed the consistent enforcement of 
multilateral disciplines, and has sustained a legal system that is stable and 
predictable from the perspective of emerging powers (ibid). Despite criticisms for 
lacking accountability, the WTO has provided sufficient transparency in trade 
transactions, encouraging both established and emerging powers to uphold their 
collective commitment to free trade (Wolfe, 2012). In this respect, the WTO’s 
mechanisms have also been reinforced by other international organisations 
(including non-economic ones) that ‘lock-in’ the commitments of major economic 
powers, raise the costs of defection and reduce uncertainty, and, consequently, 
decrease the incentives for protectionism (Baccini and Kim, 2012). 
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Emerging economies have also played a crucial role in retaining openness in global 
trade. Recent statistical analyses have demonstrated that leading developing 
countries (including Brazil, China and India) have resisted after 2008 the prospect of 
increasing protectionism. Since their applied tariffs (real measures in place) are 
lower than their bounded tariffs (levels agreed under the WTO), emerging 
economies could have raised their tariffs without facing retaliation from developed 
economies (Gawande et al, 2014, p. 4). Their increasing participation, however, in 
the global trading regime and global supply chains has generated powerful 
incentives within the BRICS against increasing their applied tariffs. The WTO has 
enhanced these incentives directly, through rules and regulations that maintain 
open markets, or indirectly, by minimising uncertainty and sustaining the 
specialisation in global supply chains which allow emerging economies to benefit 
from liberalisation (ibid, p. 25). These findings verify those unipolarity approaches 
that stress emerging powers view the liberal order as providing economic 
opportunities that can be realised through integration and not revisionism. 
The willingness of emerging and established powers to share leadership and their 
commitment to open trade eventually translated into progress in the DDA 
negotiations. The ministerial conferences that took place during the height of the 
crisis (in 2009 and 2011) were treated by established and emerging powers as 
stocktaking exercises that would explore possible areas of convergence and avoid 
the political escalation that had typically surrounded previous conferences (Scott 
and Wilkinson, 2010). The willingness of established and emerging powers to 
compromise eventually became apparent at the 2013 Bali ministerial conference 
that focused on the issues of food security and trade facilitation. Food security was 
promoted by India with the aim of maintaining domestic food subsidies, while trade 
facilitation was promoted by the US to help streamline bureaucratic procedures that 
hindered trade. The ministerial initially appeared deadlocked but the final day of 
negotiations saw the US and India reaching consensus. An agreement was reached 
after the WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo held consecutive meetings with 
the Indian Commerce Minister Anand Sharma and the United States Trade 
Representative Michael Froman in order to find language acceptable to both parties 
(Bridges Daily Update, 6 December 2013). The ministerial was a landmark moment 
not only because it allowed for revitalising the role of the WTO in a time of global 
crisis, but also because it was an indication of how the great power concert could 
operate. 
The post-2008 landscape overall depicts two key processes that have comprised the 
foundations of a great power concert: the willingness of established and emerging 
powers to share leadership and their commitment to a liberal trading order. The first 
condition has provided all major powers with ‘status incentives’ while the latter with 
the ‘economic incentives’ to participate in a great power concert (Rosecrance, 2002). 
Such conditions do not necessarily mean that the concert will be fully formed and 
maintained in the long-run. They do suggest, however, that established and 
emerging powers have recognised the existence of multipolar trading system where 
each power holds veto power but cannot unilaterally enforce consensus. The system 
is mutually beneficial for all major powers in terms of prestige and economic gains, 
while all parties understand they would be worse-off if they allowed the system to 
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collapse. To fully materialise the potential of this system all major powers promote a 
degree of reform. In this respect, the initial phase of a great power concert and 
especially the stance of emerging powers in this early phase can be fully understood 
through the notion of reformist multipolarity. 
 
Reformist multipolarity 
The condition of a nascent great power concert ensures that major powers share a 
fundamental commitment to the WTO system but have yet to agree on the rights 
and responsibilities of each party. In this process, established and emerging powers 
retain a reformist stance, although such reformism is more pronounced in the case 
of the latter since emerging powers had a lesser participation in the original design 
of the WTO system. Reformism overall reflects the world-views of emerging powers 
in a nascent great power concert and comprise an approach that contributes to 
rather than undermining the legitimacy of the concert. As demonstrated above, 
emerging powers are not willing to engage in revisionist politics but rather promote 
their preferences through the WTO system. This final section argues that the notion 
of reformism is a useful analytical tool provided by critical perspectives, but to be 
fully developed it must be associated with the diplomacy of re-balancing the re-
negotiation that emerging power pursue in a multipolar setting. 
The key analytical move for understanding reformism is to denote how it cannot be 
mistaken for mere conformism as certain critical perspectives suggest, but rather as 
a process of re-negotiation within a great power concert. In contemporary global 
governance, emerging powers seek to re-negotiate the rights and responsibilities of 
major economies and promote the re-balancing of power and authority in the 
governance of the world economy to strengthen the voice of the global South 
(Nederveen Pieterse, 2011). Instead of seeking to overthrow existing institutions 
through revisionism, emerging powers rather seek to reshape global governance 
because of their increasing confidence and ability in reforming the institutions of the 
liberal order (Nel, 2010, p. 952). Such reform aims to promote the redistribution of 
global resources and the recognition of the higher status of emerging powers, and 
bears a historical continuity (rather than discontinuity as critical approaches suggest) 
with the struggle for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (ibid). The 
participation of emerging powers in global governance is not a process of 
“hegemonic incorporation” enforced by the US but rather one of “collectivist 
cooperation” where emerging states possess sufficient weight in the global economy 
to secure their participating at the highest tables of decision-making (Beeson and 
Bell, 2009). 
Reformism must be understood in a historical context as critical perspectives argue 
but should not only be treated as a process of declining counter-hegemony even 
though it may be the result of this process. Emerging powers can re-define key 
norms of global governance and promote their own vision of liberalism. Unipolarity 
perspectives have shown how they strive to support the liberal order although these 
perspectives have not fully clarified how the BRICS adhere to the foundations of the 
liberal order but seek to change the most neo-liberal aspects of this order. The 
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concept of reformism better portrays how the vision of the BRICS does not merely 
conform to the neo-liberal model but aspires to re-negotiate the rights the emerging 
powers in the liberal order. A major part of this effort is the preoccupation of the 
BRICS with retaining a central role for the state in managing the economy and 
regulating trade flows (Stephen, 2013). This is a hybrid approach to global 
governance where the BRICS are dependent upon and increasingly favourable to the 
institutions of the liberal order but continue to challenge the most neo-liberal 
arrangements of this order (for ex. unconstrained financial flows, human rights and 
interventionism) (ibid, pp. 17-19). Like the developmental states of South-East Asia 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the BRICS have re-discovered the role of the state in 
managing development while selectively adopting certain ideas of the Washington 
Consensus. Such a hybrid approach may not amount to counter-hegemony but 
nevertheless challenges those policies of the Washington Consensus the severely 
limit the role of the state. For example, the BRICS have improved their voice in the 
IMF and the World Bank and have endorsed the mission of these institutions but 
have also questioned certain of the conditionalities imposed by these institutions 
(Ban and Blyth, 2013). 
The same reformist approach can be identified in the WTO. Throughout the Doha 
Round, emerging powers have sought to re-negotiate key aspects of the WTO and 
promote a more developmental form of trade liberalisation. As unipolarity 
approaches suggest, the liberal order has facilitated the social learning and 
integration of emerging powers and has allowed them to participate in a multipolar 
system of governance. Unipolarity approaches, however, would have to examine in 
greater detail how such integration has also allowed emerging powers to re-shape 
the WTO system from within. Such approaches would be correct in arguing that 
emerging powers increasingly act as supporters of trade liberalisation, but would 
also need to examine how emerging powers deploy the free trade rhetoric to re-
interpret certain principles of trade liberalisation and redefine the relationship 
between trade and development (Ford, 2003). Emerging powers have delegitimised 
the unfair policies of Western economies and have exposed their hypocrisy in 
advocating free trade while maintaining protectionist measures (Taylor, 2009). Brazil 
and India have made significant advances in blocking agendas deemed harmful for 
the global South and demanding greater liberalisation in critical areas for developing 
countries such as agriculture. China and India have demanded special emergency 
clauses for developing countries in agriculture, striving to re-negotiate the role of the 
state in regulating trade flows and retaining domestic policy space (Brink et al, 2013). 
Such positions demonstrate that the reformism of the BRICS fully support the 
foundations of the liberal order but aspires the re-negotiate the rights of major 
economies in a multipolar trade system. 
Critical approaches have clearly explained how the domestic trade sectors of states 
like Brazil and India have undergone a process of liberalisation initially dictated by 
the external forces of the liberal order. They have not acknowledged, however, how 
these restructured sectors have allowed Brazil and India to take a more proactive 
stance and re-shape the agenda of the WTO (Da Conceição-Heldt, 2013). They have 
also neglected how the process of state restructuring has been different for each of 
the BRICS. The interplay between material capabilities and diplomatic leadership has 
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been different for Brazil, India and China, as the former two have influenced WTO 
negotiations mainly through activism and coalition-building, while the latter mainly 
through its economic weight (Hopewell, 2014). Critical perspectives would also have 
to account for how emerging powers strategically use certain trade policies rather 
than solely removing their trade barriers. As unipolarity approaches note, these 
states have generally resisted increasing their applied tariffs. The BRICS have 
maintained, however, the option of occasionally using certain Temporary Trade 
Barriers (TTBs) such as import-restricting anti-dumping, safeguards and 
countervailing duty policies (Bown and Crowley, 2014). Deploying such measures is 
consistent with WTO disciplines and does not reflect a shift to protectionism, as the 
proponents of great power conflict suggest. It does demonstrate, however, that 
emerging economies are not simply disciplined by external pressures to liberalise as 
critical approaches suggest, but have been able to maintain substantial autonomy in 
their conduct of domestic and international trade policy-making. 
Reformism overall reveals how emerging powers act in a great power concert. They 
are not system-takers passively socialised into the concert, nor are they system-
shapers that radically seek to alter the liberal order. They are rather engaged in a 
more complex process of “reciprocal socialisation” through which they internalise 
key norms of the liberal order while simultaneously promoting their preferences 
within, and reshaping the liberal order (Terhalle, 2011; Xiaoyu, 2012). The flexible 
nature of a great power concert facilitates such a process. In contrast to 
multipolarity perspectives that identify processes of conflict and revisionism, the 
liberal order allows for such pluralist forms of global governance to develop (Hurrell, 
2013).  A great power concert allows established and emerging powers to maintain 
their different interpretations over the management of the liberal order, but at the 
same time provides the informal diplomatic and summitry avenues for negotiating 
such differences and diffusing tensions. A great power concert in a system of 
reformist multipolarity needs not be seen as the embodiment of great power 
alignment and common world-vision in re-constructing the global order. It is rather 
an environment for managing disagreement among major powers, responding to 
global shocks, providing stability, and maintaining “minimum standards of order in 
the international society of states” (Kirton, 1989). 
Reformist multipolarity therefore only constitutes the first phase in the transition 
towards a great power concert in global trade. In this phase, all key players share the 
need to participate in the system but have yet to agree on the appropriate balance 
of commitments to be undertaken by each side. All key players recognise that global 
economic governance can only function if both established and emerging powers 
participate in the management and conduct of the global economy. They have yet to 
agree, however, on the benefits and levels of burden sharing to be allocated to each 
major player. The phase of reformist multipolarity naturally includes recurrent 
phases of deadlocks in the negotiations as evident in the Doha Round. This is 
because the current power transition is taking place to a large extent through the 
channels of global governance (Ikenberry, 2010). It is therefore normal to be 
witnessing prolonged fluctuations and tensions in this form of negotiations. Despite 
the persistence of deadlocks, reformist multipolarity allows for re-negotiating major 
power roles and re-balancing formal and informal decision-making power in 
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international institutions. It allows for accommodating divergent preferences and 
expectations within the existing institutional architecture, and, most importantly, 
diffuses tensions that could lead to systemic breakdown. 
 
Conclusion 
The power transition that has unfolded in the WTO can be understood as the 
emergence of reformist multipolarity in global trade governance. Such a system 
entails three major and inter-linked conditions. First, it is based on a multipolar 
decision-making process where established and emerging powers hold veto power 
over the process but commit to the stable management of the system. Second, it is 
indicative of a nascent great power concert where the established and emerging 
powers in this concert share a common world-view on the centrality of the WTO to 
operate as the overarching authority for regulating and managing global trade. Third, 
emerging states maintain a reformist approach in the concert since the rights and 
responsibilities to be undertaken by each major stakeholder are still negotiated. 
These attributes are relevant to understanding the role of concerts in global 
economic governance. Apart from the WTO, different bodies such as the G-20 
Leaders Forum, the IMF and the World Bank could be witnessing similar conditions, 
especially as these institutions have begun to recognise the central role of the BRICS 
in managing the global economy. Changes in one institution could affect the re-
balancing of decision-making power in other institutions, with these processes being 
mutually reinforcing. Beyond the domain of global economic governance, great 
power concerts would have to be assessed in a different light. This is because major 
areas of security such as nuclear non-proliferation, democratisation and 
humanitarian intervention create different dynamics that arguably pose greater 
obstacles to the formation of great power concerts. Despite the existence of 
different conditions in the economic and security domains of global governance, the 
notions of reformist multipolarity and great power concert would allow for 
considering the different stages towards great power cooperation and the different 
paths to alleviating great power conflict in the liberal order. 
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